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Abstract
This paper focuses on the impact of international migration on the transfer of polit-
ical and social norms. Exploiting recent and unique data on Morocco, this paper
explores whether households with return and current migrants bear different politi-
cal preferences and behaviours than non-migrant families. Once controlling for the
double selection into emigration and return migration, the findings suggest that hav-
ing a returnee in the household increases the demand for political and social change.
This result is driven by returnees mostly from Western European countries, who were
exposed to more democratic norms in the destination. However, we find a negative
impact of having a current migrant on the willingness of the left-behind households to
change. This result is driven by migrants to non-Western countries, where the quality
of political and social institutions is lower. Our results are robust to also controlling
for destination selectivity.
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1 Introduction
In the early 2010s, the Arab world saw a revolutionary wave of protests spreading
throughout the region, sparked by dissatisfaction with the rule of governments, as
well as human rights’ violations and political corruption. By 2014, civil uprisings
had spread across the Arab countries, most notably in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen
and Syria. Everybody was asking for one thing: change.
A salient feature of all those troubled Arab countries—with the exception of
Libya—is that they have high emigration rates. Hence, an interesting question given
this context is whether international migration is a driver of political and social
change. More precisely, are returnees more likely to ask for change than non-
migrants? Do current migrants catalyse the diffusion of new values? This paper
explores the migration-induced transfer of political and social norms and its link-
ages with political outcomes. It examines whether international migrants contribute
to a change in preferences and behaviours by channelling modern political norms
from destination countries to Morocco (a high emigration country). In addition, it
investigates the importance of destinations in the transmission of social remittances,
in particular, in the adoption of liberal values, since newly incorporated norms vary
according to the level of democracy and political accountability in host countries.
We focus on a North African country—Morocco—which is one of the world’s
leading emigration countries, with an estimated 4.5 million Moroccans residing
abroad in 2014, approximately 13% of the population. In particular, more than 3 million
Moroccans are living in Europe making them one of the largest migrant communities
in Europe (Hamdouch and Wahba 2015). At the same time, Morocco has been seen
instigating calls for political change over the last few years. Inspired by the wave
of protests in the neighbouring countries, demonstrators rallied during 2011–2012 to
fight government corruption, a lack of civil rights and absence of legitimate elections.
The main aim of our analysis is to test the potential causal link of these two key
features of Morocco: that is, whether migration shapes political attitudes. Empirical
studies on the impact of international migration on social remittances and in partic-
ular on political norms are recent and growing (see Section 2 for a comprehensive
review of the existing literature). However, a large segment of those studies do not
directly observe how migration affects the political views of migrants or their house-
holds as they tend to measure both migration and social remittances at a local level
(see for example Pfutze 2012 and Chauvet and Mercier 2014). In contrast, we exam-
ine the direct effect of international migration on political attitudes and preferences
and identify the underlying mechanisms behind the potential impact of migration.
Moreover, the previous literature often adopted proxies of political beliefs, such as
institutional quality and democracy, which do not entirely capture individuals’ prefer-
ences nor measure the likelihood of migrants acting as a catalyst of political change.
We exploit unique information on migration experiences and political and social
norms at the individual level, allowing a direct estimation of the impact of migration
on the preference for change.
Our second contribution to the literature is in addressing several selections, and in
particular selection into the destination. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
study simultaneously tackling all three possible selections: selection into emigration,
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selection into return migration and, most importantly, selection into the destination.1
We address the double selection into emigration and into return migration, since both
migrants and returnees are not random samples of the population, but they may be
self-selected on the basis of observed and unobserved characteristics. Importantly,
we also address an additional source of selectivity that is self-sorting into destination
countries. Indeed, this may be a remarkable source of bias in the previous literature
on the migration-induced transfer of norms. We tackle endogeneity and selectivity
issues by adopting a multi-equation mixed system, where both emigration selectivity,
selection into return migration and destination sorting are taken into account.
We also compare the different impacts of returnees and diaspora on political and
social change. Whilst the vast majority of previous studies have focused on a single
category of migrants (exceptions are Batista and Vicente 2011 and Barsbai et al.
2017), only an overall analysis of all types of international migration can give a clear
picture of the mechanisms behind the migration-induced transfer of norms. We hence
compare the attitudes of returnee households to the ones of non-migrants, as well as
the norms of the left-behind family members of current migrants to those of non-
migrants. In addition, we also examine the heterogeneity of Moroccan emigrants’
destinations in order to corroborate the findings on the importance of host countries.
Variation in the destinations of Moroccans to Western and Arab countries allows
us to estimate opposite preferences for political and social change according to the
institutions in place abroad. Finally, to show the potential impact of migration on
actual outcomes as opposed to on just attitudes and preferences, albeit at the locality
level, we show how a greater exposure to return migration is correlated with higher
turnout rates to the 2011 parliamentary elections.
Our estimates suggest that, once controlling for selections, return migration boosts
the demand for political and social change in Morocco. Results are driven by
returnees from the West, which have been exposed to more democratic norms in the
destination. In contrast, households with a current migrant are on average less likely
to ask for change than non-migrant families, driven by migrants to non-Western
countries. The findings are robust to different specifications, sub-samples and tech-
niques. This suggests that social remittances can not only be positive but also negative
depending on the country of destination where the migrant lived. To confirm the
importance of our findings, we also present results based on the 2011 World Value
Survey and the 2004 Census, showing that returnees affect general political attitudes
in the region where they live. In addition, we show that return migration is associ-
ated with outcomes such as the turnout for elections, as we find that regions with larger
returnee shares were more likely to have greater turnout to the 2011 political elections.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: After a review of the existing litera-
ture on the migration-induced transfer of political norms in Section 2, Section 3 introduces
stylized facts on the migration patterns in Morocco, as well as provides a description of
the data used in our main analysis. Section 4 presents our methodology and econo-
1Tuccio and Wahba (2018) study the effect of return migration in Jordan on women empowerment and
decision making but they do not address the destination selection as they focus only on return migrants
who went to Arab countries.
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metric approach. Estimation results on return and current migration are discussed in
Section 5, whilst Section 6 presents extensions to the analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Given their importance for economic performance, there has been growing interest in
the determinants of political institutions in the last years (see for example Barro 1999
and Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). A specific focus of that literature has been on
what triggers political change and in particular on the impact of economic downturns.
For instance, Brückner and Ciccone (2011) show that negative shocks measured by
rainfall can lead to democratic improvement, whilst Chaney (2013) uses historical
data to show that economic crises increase the probability of the collapse of autocratic
regimes by temporarily altering the balance of political power. Others have examined
several alternative factors behind political transitions such as the role of mass media
in affecting political outcomes (Enikolopov et al. 2011) or the role of riots and clashes
(Aidt and Franck 2015). Focusing on the Arab World, Campante and Chor (2012)
argue that the recent political changes observed since 2011 are due to educational
expansion and unrewarding labour market opportunities.
Closer to our interest is the relationship between international migration and polit-
ical institutions. Focusing on the quality of institutions and using panel data for
bilateral student flows from 1950 to 2003, the seminal work of Spilimbergo (2009)
provides evidence that foreign educated individuals promote domestic democracy,
but only if the level of democracy in destination countries is high. After the pio-
neering contribution of Spilimbergo (2009), a new strand of the economic literature
started to look at the migration-induced transfer of norms or social remittances.
At the macro level, there have been a few studies looking at the impact of emigration on
the quality of institutions, such as Beine and Sekkat (2013), who find a positive and sig-
nificant effect of international migration on the change in institutions, and Docquier et al.
(2016), who confirm these findings when restricting the focus to developing countries.
At the micro level, instead, several studies exploited electoral data. Looking at the
2000–2002 Mexican municipal elections, Pfutze (2012) estimates that a one percent-
age point increase in the proportion of migrant households in a municipality boosts
the probability that a party in opposition to the former state party wins the elections
by more than half a percent. Chauvet and Mercier (2014) use electoral data from
Mali in order to explore the link between return migration and political outcomes.
They find that localities with greater shares of returnees from non-African countries
are more likely to have higher electoral participation rates. Similarly, Barsbai et al.
(2017) provide evidence that Moldovan municipalities sending migrants to demo-
cratic countries experience an increase in political support for more democratic and
liberal parties in elections. However, none of these studies observe neither individual
migration experience nor individual voting behaviour.2 In an attempt to address the
2In order to explain their district-level results of a political spillover from emigration, Barsbai et al. (2017)
draw on individual-level data from the Moldovan Political Barometer and exit polls, but without dealing
with the selectivity and endogeneity issues.
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endogeneity issues arising from the reverse causality between emigration and polit-
ical opinions, Chauvet et al. (2016) adopt a multi-sited exit-poll survey conducted
during the 2013 Malian elections in Paris, Abidjan and Bamako together with an
instrumental variable strategy. They find that Malians in France have more demo-
cratic views than both migrants in Cote d’Ivoire and non-migrants, but they deal with
a highly selected sample to start with, namely Malian voters in Mali, France and
Cote d’Ivoire, and do not show the transfer of norms to the left-behind families. In a
similar vein, also Karakoċ et al. (2017) use original survey data from Egypt to show
that individuals with household members who had emigrated to the Gulf were more
likely to vote for Islamist parties in the last election. However, no attempt is made to
disentangle migrant selectivity and endogeneity issues.
A growing strand of the literature looked specifically at the impact of emigration
on corruption back home. Batista and Vicente (2011) customize a survey of perceived
corruption in public services in Cape Verde, where they additionally ask respondents
to mail a pre-stamped postcard if they wanted the anonymous results of the survey
to be made publicly available in the media. Interestingly, localities with high inter-
national emigration prevalence had higher demand for political accountability. Ivlevs
and King (2017) exploit the Gallup Balkan Monitor to show that the emigration of
family members and close friends reduces bribery and the acceptability of corrup-
tion among those staying behind in the source countries. In a similar vein, Höckel
et al. (2018) find that parental emigration is correlated with a reduction in informal
payments to school teachers.
It is worth stressing that—in addition to the diffusion of political norms at the core
of this paper—the economic literature has also focused on the migration-induced
transfer of other types of norms, such as fertility (Beine et al. 2013; Bertoli and
Marchetta 2015), gender norms (Tuccio and Wahba 2018; Diabate and Mesplé-
Somps 2019), civic-engagement and pro-social behaviour (Nikolova et al. 2017).
Overall, the existing evidence points at a correlation between the values and opin-
ions of host countries and those of the left-behind families of migrants abroad. In
spite of a clear nexus between the two, there is still large scope for further corrobo-
rating analysis on the matter, especially because of the strong bias that endogeneity
and selectivity issues carry when trying to assess the transfer of social norms through
migration. Not least as the literature has not attempted to disentangle the destination
choice selectivity which could be confounding previous findings.
3 The case of Morocco
3.1 Migration in Morocco
Over the last decades, Morocco has become one of the world’s leading emigration
countries. Over 4 million Moroccans are estimated to be living abroad. Almost three
million Moroccans live in Europe. The largest concentration of Moroccans living
abroad is in France. In the Netherlands, Moroccans are the third largest group and
in Belgium Moroccans are the largest group of non-EU immigrants. Yet, in terms of
absolute numbers of Moroccans, Spain hosts the second largest Moroccan diaspora
1176 M. Tuccio et al.
followed by Italy. The remainder of Moroccans are dispersed in the USA and Canada
among other countries, whilst about 5% are in other Arab countries.3
Seasonal and circular migration patterns within national borders have character-
ized Morocco’s pre-colonial population history for centuries. However, the great
migration boom has exploded only in the 1960s, when the European economies were
rapidly expanding in the aftermath of World War II and were in need of unskilled
labour for their mining, industry and construction sectors. Until the mid of the 1970s
economic and oil crisis, both Moroccan emigrants and host countries were expect-
ing migration to be temporary in nature, and return migration was a key feature of
the Moroccan diaspora. On average, Moroccans resided for 7 to 10 years in Europe
and then returned home (Hamdouch and Wahba 2015), but the following period
of economic stagnation led European governments to close their borders to new
migrants, and many Moroccans decided not to return but stay in their host countries.
It was mainly through family reunification programme and irregular migration that
the Moroccan diaspora in Europe managed to grow steadily.
A direct consequence of the restriction of immigration policies in northwest
Europe was a diversification in migration patterns. Many new Moroccan immigrants
shifted from classic destinations, such as France, Belgium, Germany and Nether-
lands, to the southern countries of Spain and Italy, where undocumented trespassing
or overstaying was easier. Similarly, a significant number of Moroccans migrated to
Libya and oil-producing Gulf countries, as well as to the USA and French-speaking
Canada.
Although return migration is relatively less important in Morocco than in other
Middle Eastern and North African neighbouring countries, it is certainly a growing
feature, especially over the last few years, when the financial crisis lowered eco-
nomic opportunities everywhere, and in particular in those countries where Moroccan
immigration is important, such as Spain and Italy. However, national estimates of
Moroccan returnees are out-dated. The only national data available are those of the
2004 population census, which indicates an average of 33,100 returnees per year.4
As mentioned by de Haas (2014), migration data from European destinations suggest
that about a quarter of Moroccans who migrated between 1981 and 2009 returned to
Morocco. Also, the share of returnees fluctuates with the business cycle in Europe.
As a result of the lack of data, research on return migration in Morocco is rather
limited. A few studies though have examined returnees’ occupational choice and
entrepreneurship. Using detailed survey data collected by the Centre for Studies and
Demographic Research (CERED) at the High Commission of Planning (HCP) in
2003–2004 on return migrants in two main regions of Morocco (Great Casablanca
and Souss-Massa-Draa), Hamdouch and Wahba (2015) examine the determinants
of entrepreneurial behaviour among return migrants, controlling for the potential
endogeneity of migration duration, and the potential endogenous impact of having
invested overseas. Another exception is Gubert and Nordman (2011) who, using the
3See Khachani (2012) and de Haas (2014) for a survey on migration trends in Morocco.
4This estimate is eventually an underestimation of the real extent of return migration, since it does not take
into account undocumented and illegal migration.
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DReMM data, explore the occupational status of returnees in Morocco and in the
whole Maghreb.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper examining the impact of both current and
return migration on political and social attitudes in Morocco. Although Morocco has
not seen the turmoil caused by the Arab Spring in other parts of the Arab world,
intense pro-democracy demonstrations were put in place in 2011 by the “February
20 Movement” against the political, social and economic conditions. As a result, a
new constitution aimed at improving democracy and the rule of law was adopted by
referendum in July 2011 .
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
The analysis of this paper is based on a new and unique dataset, the “Investiga-
tion on the Impact of International Migration on Development in Morocco” (IIIMD),
produced by the Association Migration Internationale with the support of the Inter-
national Organization for Migration and the Ministry for the Moroccans Residing
Abroad and Emigration. The survey was conducted in August–October 2013 for
about 1200 households. Since the investigation is national in scope, it covers the
entire national territory and is a representative sample of all private households in
Morocco (including those composed of foreign individuals), representing the 16
regions of the country in the two areas of residence (urban and rural). The observed
units consist of both households having no migrant member, households with one
or more migrants currently abroad, households with one or more returnees and
households with at least one immigrant.
The sampling frame used in IIIMD is based on the repeated national demographic
survey sample (ENDPR) carried out by the Office of the High Commissioner in
2009–2010 to ensure the representativeness of the sample (households with interna-
tional migrants, households with immigrants, households without migrants etc.). The
sample of the repeated national demographic survey is itself based on the master sam-
ple set up by the Statistics Directorate following the 2004 General Population and
Housing Census (RGPH) to meet the needs of household surveys representing the
entire national territory, and consequently all regions and social strata of the country.
The IIIMD sampling was multi-stage.5 In a first step, 62 primary units were ran-
domly selected from the ENDPR survey proportionally to the size of the units in
terms of density of the various types of migrants (returnee and current). Then, two
secondary units were randomly drawn in each primary unit (with equal probabilities).
Lastly, 10 households have been selected with equal probabilities in each secondary
unit. Sampling weights are provided and are used in the analysis.
The dataset contains unique features that are key for our analysis. Firstly, it
includes questions on non-migrant, current and return migrant households, which
can be exploited to compare different types of migration experiences, and also to
control for the double selection into emigration and return migration. Specifically,
the observed units consist of both native-born households with no migrant (243),
5See Hamdouch and Mghari (2014) for more details about the IIIMD survey methodology.
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Table 1 Characteristics of migrants





Other European countries 0.080 0.158
USA 0.009 0.046
Canada 0.013 0.020
Arab countries 0.111 0.033
African countries 0.004 0.002
Other countries 0.009 0.003
Educational level
No education 0.413 0.110
Primary education 0.173 0.219
College 0.200 0.252
Secondary education 0.153 0.287
Post-secondary education 0.060 0.125
Duration of migration
Years 11.32 11.51
Data source: IIIMD 2013
native-born households with one or more family members currently abroad (658),
native-born households with one or more returnee family members (228) and foreign-
born (non-Moroccans) households (105). In each household, only one individual is
interviewed, but information about the whole household is collected. In the majority
of cases, the head of household, or failing that the spouse, is the respondent.6
Table 1 compares destination and education levels of current and return migrants.
Host countries are similar for both types of migrants. Interestingly, France, Italy or
Spain is the destination of around three quarters of migrants. On average, return and
current migrants have spent the same time abroad (11 years), which is consistent with
the aforementioned stylized fact that nowadays Moroccans tend to stay longer at the
destination, due to restrictive immigration policies which would impede them from
returning to the host country if they leave. On the other hand, educational attainment
differs greatly between current and return migrants. Returnees are less educated, with
6In our econometric analysis, we also control for whether the respondent is the head of household or not.
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41% uneducated individuals, whilst only 11% of current migrants have not under-
taken formal education. Conversely, over 40% of current migrants hold a secondary
or higher degree, a proportion which is halved for returnees.
A second distinctive feature of the IIIMD is the inclusion of questions on the will-
ingness to change the social and political landscapes, which are a direct measure of
individuals’ attitudes and beliefs. For instance, we exploit a set of variables included
in the IIIMD on political and social norms, administered to both households with a
returnee, families with a current migrant abroad and non-migrant households. Our
analysis is based on five questions on the willingness to change the traditional Moroc-
can society and politics: (1) “Are you happy about how Morocco is administered?”
(2) “I think we should defend the traditional lifestyle in Morocco”. (3) “We need to
make more effort in order to treat men and women equally”. (4) “We need to make
more effort in order to treat everybody equally”. (5) “I think people should be more
involved in the decision-making process”.
We adopt several dimensionality reduction techniques in order to aggregate the
five aforementioned variables into a composite index of political and social norms.
Nevertheless, we also run specifications with each single indicator as the depen-
dent variable to show that our results are not driven by the construction of the
composite index. In our benchmark analysis, we use principal components analysis
(PCA), which has been extensively used to construct multidimensional and compos-
ite indexes (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). Its clear advantage is to measure the group
of weights that explains the largest variation in the original variables. The robustness
of our composite indicator is tested by using two additional weighting techniques.
Firstly, we adopt multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), which has been often
preferred to analyze qualitative, categorical and binary variables (Asselin 2002). Sec-
ondly, we make use of equal weights that have largely been used for their simplicity
and apparent objectivity (Tuccio and Wahba 2018).
The proposed index of political and social change is constructed such that it takes
values from 0, corresponding to preference for no change, to 1, meaning complete
preference for change, and it is given by:
Y
j
i = Ai1Wj1 + Ai2Wj2 + ... + AiqWjq (1)
where Y ji is the value of composite index Y for individual i using the weighting
technique j (namely, PCA, MCA and Equal weights), Aiq is the answer of individual
i to question q and Wjq is the weight obtained using the j methodology applied to
question q.7
The analysis of this paper is restricted to individuals who are working age (15–
65 years old) at the time of the survey, in order to exclude those individuals whose
political norms may be very different due to their young or old age. Moreover, we
exclude from the analysis migrants who left the country for political issues, as well
7Table 13 in the Appendix lists the five variables that are used to construct the Political and Social Change
Index and the respective weights using PCA, MCA and equal weights. Larger weights imply greater
preference for political and social change.
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Table 2 Characteristics of respondents from households with no migrants, returnees and current migrants
Without migrant With returnee With current
Political and social change (%)
Political administration 0.24 0.32 0.29
Civil engagement 0.92 0.86* 0.89
Traditional lifestyle 0.06 0.04 0.04
Gender equality 0.89 0.89 0.89
Social cohesion 0.94 0.95 0.94
Composite index (PCA) 0.61 0.61 0.61
Composite index (MCA) 0.8 0.79 0.79
Composite index (equal weights) 0.61 0.61 0.61
Educational level (%)
No education 0.35 0.40 0.40
Primary education 0.23 0.18 0.20
College 0.15 0.18 0.12
Secondary education 0.18 0.19 0.20
Superior education 0.09 0.06 0.09
Individual characteristics
Female 0.29 0.19* 0.43***
Age 48.5 54.44*** 53.79***
Married 0.81 0.79 0.69***
Rural areas 0.15 0.16 0.12
Metropolis 0.23 0.19 0.22
Employment status 0.54 0.45 0.34***
Head of household 0.73 0.74 0.69
Accommodation owner 0.63 0.89*** 0.80***
N 216 225 658
t test for different means, where the control group is always those individuals with no migrant in the
household. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Data source: IIIMD,
2013
as returnees who came back to Morocco for political reasons, since they would bias
our estimates.8 Finally, immigrants are not included as non-migrant households since
they may carry a different set of political and social norms than natives.
Table 2 compares the characteristics of individuals from households with a
returnee, individuals from a current migrant household and individuals from non-
8Note that all our estimates exclude individuals who self-reported having left or returned to Morocco for
political reasons as they are only a very small share (less than 1%) of our sample, but would bias our
estimates. We have though, as a robustness check, included those migrants and found that all our results
are robust.
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migrant households. It appears clear that, without controlling for selectivity issues,
individuals in our sample do not differ along most of characteristics. In particular, our
outcomes of interest (i.e. the five proxies of political and social change, as well as the
three different composite indicators using PCA, MCA and equal weights) do not sug-
gest specific differences among migration experiences. Econometric techniques are




We first focus on return migration. We are interested in understanding whether
returnee households differ in their political norms from non-migrant households. We
therefore model two interrelated decisions: the propensity to want change (2) and the
probability of being a returnee (3). The preference for change in the political and
social landscapes is proxied by the constructed composite indicator Yi .
Yi = α0 + α1Ri + α2Xi + α3Fr + εi (2)
In Eq. 2, Yi is the level of political and social change desired by individual i, which
can take any value between 0 and 1, where 0 means no change and 1 implies com-
plete change. Ri is the return migration variable, a dummy equal to 1 if the individual
has at least a returnee member within the household. Xi is a vector of individual char-
acteristics, including age, educational attainment, marital status, employment status
and living in a rural area or in a metropolis (3 biggest Moroccan cities: Casablanca,
Fez, Rabat-Sale), being the head of the household and a dummy for owing the accom-
modation, a proxy for wealth.9 Fixed effects at the regional level are absorbed by Fr ,
whilst εi is a zero-mean error term.
The return migration decision is instead denoted by R and is observed only when
the latent variable measuring the gains from being a return migrant (R∗) is positive.
{
R = 1 if R∗ > 0, M > 0
R = 0 otherwise (3)
However, we need to introduce a third decision, since return migration is only
measured if the individual has emigrated. Hence, R is only observed if an individual
has emigrated i.e. M > 0. The emigration decision (M) is observed when the latent
variable measuring the gains from migration (M∗) is positive.
{
M = 1 if M∗ > 0
M = 0 otherwise (4)
9As a robustness check, we excluded educational attainment, employment status and home ownership as
controls that could potentially be endogeneous, and all our results are robust.
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We therefore estimate a multi-equation mixed system, where the three decisions
above are estimated simultaneously using a conditional mixed process (CMP) esti-
mator (Wahba 2015). CMP fits a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework,
in which regressors seem unrelated as no endogenous component appears as explana-
tory variable in the other equations, although their errors can be correlated (Roodman
2011). In CMP, equations may vary in sample sizes: selection equations will be mod-
elled for the full data set, whilst the dependent variable of interest in equation (2) will
be modelled for the subset with complete observations.10
4.2 Identification
Although our data allow us to control for observable variables affecting the selec-
tion of migrants, unobservables may still induce those who have migrated to be
self-selected on the basis of some latent characteristics. If both emigrants and return
migrants are not a random sample of the Moroccan population, estimates would be
biased. The correct identification of the full structural model requires two valid exclu-
sion restrictions for the emigration and return decisions. For the emigration decision,
we construct a proxy for the attractiveness of the foreign labour market in each year.
Specifically, our measure is given by:
At = max(Gjt − Gmt)W 1990j (5)
At is the most attractive foreign labour market at time t . Gjt is the GDP per capita
growth rate of destination j at time t , whilst Gmt is the growth rate of Morocco at
time t .11 This measure of foreign attractiveness is weighted by the size of the diaspora
given the importance not only of economic factors, but also of social networks in
emigration. Weights W 1990j are constructed as follows: using data from Özden et al.
(2011), we take the share of Moroccan stocks, in each destination country j, in the
total Moroccan migrant population in 1990. We adopt At for when the individual was
23 years old, which is the average year of finishing education, assuming that this is
when individuals enter in the labour market. However, we also check the robustness
of our results using an alternative age, between 25 and 30 years of age, see Table 14 in
the Appendix. The attractiveness of foreign countries relative to Morocco in the past
when the individual was 23 should have no bearing on their opinion at the time of
survey in 2013 when the average age of non-migrant is 49 and 54 years of age in the
case of return migrants. Yet, as Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013) show, individuals
10See Roodman (2011) p. 161: “CMP is flexible in another way: models can vary by observation. In
other words, they can be conditioned on the data. CMP stands for conditional mixed process. Thus within
the CMP universe is the Heckman selection model, in which sample selection (represented by a dummy
variable) is modelled in parallel with a dependent variable of interest: selection is modelled for the full
dataset, and the dependent variable is modelled for the subset that has complete observations.”
11To make sure that the relative economic attractiveness of foreign destinations to Morocco is not corre-
lated with political preferences, we run an additional robustness check where the exclusion restriction for
the probability of emigration is the absolute (rather than relative) attractiveness of foreign labour markets.
Results remain robust and are available upon request.
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who experienced a recession when young have different political beliefs when old.
Thus, as a robustness check, we test whether the relative attractiveness of foreign
countries has any effect on the political views of members of households with no
migration experience. As expected, we find no effect (see Table 15 in the Appendix).
For the return migration decision, we construct a measure of exogenous shocks
that might have induced Moroccan emigrants to return home—i.e. we use a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the migrant was exposed to conflict or unfavourable change
in legislation at the time of migration. There are several potential shocks. Firstly,
the explosion of the Gulf War in 1990 has led to a great out-migration of Moroccan
migrants from oil-producing Gulf states. Secondly, in 2000, a xenophobic uprising
exploded in Libya, triggered by the rising unemployment of natives, inconsistency
in migration policy and an increasing presence of foreign workers (Migration Policy
Centre 2013). Unrest led to the deaths of hundreds of foreigners, encouraging many
immigrants working in Libya to return to their origin countries. Thirdly, in 2004,
film-director Theodoor Van Gogh was murdered by Moroccan Mohammed Bouyeri
in Amsterdam. The murder sparked a violent storm of outrage and grief throughout
the Netherlands, which may have lead some Moroccan immigrants to return home.
In our shock variable, we also include two new pieces of legislation in destination
countries where many Moroccans were present. These laws were particularly restric-
tive against undocumented migrants, and consequently they provoked an outflow of
Moroccans. In total, 16% of our sample of returnees came back to Morocco due
to these two shocks. Firstly, in 2006, France approved a new immigration law that
toughened up restrictions on immigrants who do not have skills and qualifications
targeted by the French government as important to France (Chou and Baygert 2007).
Previously, illegal immigrants in France could obtain documents to ensure legal sta-
tus if they could demonstrate a stay in-country of 10 years or more, whilst the new law
scrapped these regulations. Moreover, the government planned approximately 26,000
deportations in that year only, due to the high volume of undocumented immigrants.
Similarly, a new immigration law was passed in Italy in 2009 that made illegal immi-
gration an official crime, and as such helping or housing undocumented migrants
resulted in a prosecutable offense. Employment of irregular migrants became pun-
ishable with up to 5 years of imprisonment. Teachers in schools were also compelled
to report undocumented children to officials.
It is worth stressing that, whilst these shocks increased the propensity to return
home in a given year, they did not affect the probability of emigration given the
multiple available destinations. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows graphically that our
chosen shocks are not associated with a decrease in the magnitude of emigration
from Morocco. In addition, negative past shocks in destination countries are clearly
not directly correlated with Moroccans’ political and social norms in 2013, as opin-
ions are measured back home on issues such as equality or on local matters such as
traditional lifestyle in Morocco.
We therefore estimate a system of three equations as follows:
⎧⎨
⎩
Yi = α0 + α1Ri + α2Xi + α3Fr + εi
Rk = β0 + β1Sk + β2Ck + β3Fr + nk
Mk = γ0 + γ1At + γ2Zk + γ3Fr + μk
(6)
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In the return migration equation, Rk is the linear probability of individual k being
a return migrant, conditional on being an emigrant, and Sk represents the shock vari-
able, constructed as previously explained. Note that individuals i in the first equation
and k in the selection equations may coincide or not. In particular, i = k if the survey
respondent i is directly the family member who migrated and returned. Conversely,
i = k if respondent i is not the returnee k himself. We also check the robustness
of our results to whether the respondent is the returnee or a member of their house-
hold in the next section. Two-thirds of the respondents in returnee households are the
returnees themselves. Importantly, we have only one individual per household in the
survey.12 Controls Ck are the characteristics of the returnee. In the emigration equa-
tion, Mk is the linear probability being an emigrant, whilst At is the attractiveness of
the foreign labour market. Controls Zk include the characteristics, such as age, sex
and education, of the migrant and the household left behind.13
5 Estimation results
5.1 Households of returnmigrants and change
We first look at the impact of having a returnee in the household on the preference for
political and social change. The main outcome variable in Table 3 is the composite
indicator of preference for change as previously constructed through principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA). In line with the descriptive statistics of Table 2, no effect is
found using a simple OLS estimator (column 1). However, controlling for selection
into return migration and emigration leads to a strongly significant impact of return
migration on the demand for political and social change (columns 2 and 3). This
emphasizes that migrants are not randomly chosen among the Moroccan population,
but are selected on the basis of some observed and unobserved characteristics.
It is worth noting that both the shock variable and the measure of attractive-
ness of the foreign labour market (instrumental variables) are significant. The shock
dummy is a good predictor of the probability of being a returnee, whilst our mea-
sure of attractiveness of the foreign labour market also has a positive and significant
impact on the likelihood of emigrating in a given year. Looking at the correlations
among equations, the results suggest a negative selection of both current and return
migrants. Return migrants are on average more unskilled, engaged in agriculture
and poorer compared with non-migrants which could explain their negative selectiv-
ity with respect to liberal views (see Hamdouch and Wahba 2015). However, those
who returned to Morocco are positively selected among the migrants’ pool. Return
migration behaviours, therefore, accentuate the selection that characterized the initial
emigration flows, as discussed by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996).
12Note that in additional regressions, we also include a dummy if the survey respondent is the returnee him-
self/herself as further control, and results are robust. Tables available upon request. Due to small sample
sizes, we cannot instead run the regressions using two complete separate samples.
13We also cluster the standard errors at the municipality level and find consistent results.
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Table 3 Return migration and the preference for political and social change
(1) (2) (3)
Political and social change
Return migration −0.004 0.059 0.093
(0.26) (2.52)** (2.72)***
















N 441 441 441
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
To test the robustness of our findings, Table 4 shows results using two alterna-
tive outcome variables: the composite index of political and social change aggregated
through multiple correspondence analysis (columns 1, 2 and 3) and using equal
weights (columns 4, 5 and 6). We can safely reject the eventuality that previous
estimates were driven by the weighting technique used to construct the compos-
ite indicator, since return migration still bears a positive and significant effect on
preference for change.
We conduct several tests to check the robustness of our results to our exclusion
restrictions. First, we use two alternative exclusion restrictions for the selection into
emigration equation. We have constructed the first alternative measure as follows:
for each year, we picked the maximum attractiveness of the foreign labour markets in
only the main destinations in each region, that is France for Europe, Canada for North
America and Libya for MENA region.14 The exclusion restriction appears to be a
strong predictor of the probability of emigration, leaving positive and significant the
14On the contrary, the former exclusion restriction considered the whole world.
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Table 4 Return migration and the preference for change using different weighting techniques
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MCA MCA MCA Equal Equal Equal
Political and social change
Return migration 0.004 0.050 0.072 0.005 0.055 0.079
(0.21) (1.88)* (2.24)** (0.33) (2.20)** (2.60)***
Probability of return migration
Shock 0.833 0.792 0.833 0.792




sigma 1 −1.163 −1.160 −1.163 −1.160
(31.30)*** (30.99)*** (31.30)*** (30.99)***
sigma 2 −0.981 −0.981
(29.59)*** (29.60)***
rho 12 −0.123 −0.143 −0.146 −0.171
(1.87)* (1.99)** (2.20)** (2.38)**
rho 13 −0.106 −0.132
(1.38) (1.66)*
rho 23 0.292 0.292
(6.45)*** (6.47)***
N 441 441 441 441 441 441
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
effect of return migration on attitudes towards change (Table 16). As second alterna-
tive exclusion restriction, we used the GDP per capita growth rate of Morocco at the age
of when the individual entered the job market (i.e. 23 years old for non-migrant and
the year of migration for migrants). This exclusion restriction should capture the push
factor rather than the pull factor for emigration. Table 17 confirms the consistency of
our previous findings. As an additional robustness check, we use a different exclusion
restriction also to address the return migration selection, exploiting conflict data from
the Correlates of War Project.15 In particular, we focus on all destination countries of
Moroccans and construct a dummy equal to 1 if the migrant has been exposed to any
militarised disputes abroad. Only current migrants abroad at the time of the conflict
could be at risk. Our findings are robust (see Table 18 in the Appendix).
Since results may be driven by the use of composite indicators (regardless of the
weighting technique applied), Table 5 shows specifications where the outcome of
interest has been replaced by the single sub-indexes. In particular, columns 1, 2 and
3 present results using the dummy variable “I am not happy with how Morocco is
run/administered” (proxy for political norms), whilst columns 4, 5 and 6 use the
15All data are publicly available at: www.correlatesofwar.org
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Table 5 Return migration and the preference for change using single variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good administration Gender equality
Political and social change
Return migration 0.060 0.126 0.176 0.060 0.069 0.099
(1.48) (1.91)* (1.86)* (1.71)* (1.57) (1.75)*
Probability of return migration
Shock 0.833 0.792 0.833 0.792




sigma 1 −1.163 −1.160 −1.163 −1.160
(31.30)*** (31.01)*** (31.30)*** (31.01)***
sigma 2 −0.980 −0.981
(29.57)*** (29.67)***
rho 12 −0.066 −0.084 −0.050 −0.064
(1.06) (1.23) (1.00) (1.18)
rho 13 −0.092 −0.071
(0.91) (0.96)
rho 23 0.292 0.290
(6.47)*** (6.44)***
N 441 441 441 441 441 441
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Columns (1-3) refer to Good
administration. Columns (4-6) refer to Gender Equality. All specifications are weighted by the sampling
weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses). The selection
equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
dummy “We need to make more effort in order to treat men and women equally”
(proxy for social norms). Findings are robust to this additional test too.
In order to understand the reasons behind the positive sign of the coefficient of
return migration, and also to clarify whether migrants do actually transfer norms
from host to home countries, we further disaggregate results by destination. By
distinguishing between migrants from Western (Europe, USA and Canada) and non-
Western (Arab) countries, we expect that returnees from more democratic countries
should drive our results, as they have assimilated more equal and democratic val-
ues whilst living abroad. Table 6 confirms our hypothesis: the findings are driven by
returnees from Western countries, whilst the coefficient for non-Western returnees
is not statistically significant which could potentially be due to the small sample
size. Column 1 of Table 6 shows that Western countries’ returnees are more likely
to want change relative to non-migrants and returnees from non-Western countries.
Comparing only returnee households, those with returnees from the West to families
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Table 6 Return migration by destination and the preference for change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unconditional Unconditional Conditional Conditional
West Non-West West West
Political and social change
Return migration 0.074 −0.044 0.067 0.068
(2.71)*** (1.15) (2.05)** (2.08)**
Probability of return migration
Shock 0.796 0.798 0.792 0.792
(28.20)*** (28.23)*** (27.41)*** (27.45)***
Probability of emigration
Attractiveness 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.051
(2.85)*** (2.89)*** (2.91)*** (2.91)***
sigma 1 −1.160 −1.160 −1.160 −1.160
(31.02)*** (31.03)*** (30.97)*** (30.98)***
sigma 2 −0.981 −0.981 −0.981 −0.980
(29.62)*** (29.63)*** (29.59)*** (29.60)***
rho 12 −0.170 −0.068 −0.243 −0.248
(2.90)*** (1.43) (2.92)*** (2.96)***
rho 13 −0.117 0.029 −0.375 −0.341
(1.43) (0.47) (1.47) (1.38)
rho 23 0.290 0.290 0.291 0.293
(6.47)*** (6.50)*** (6.47)*** (6.52)***
N 441 441 225 225
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 are conditional
on return migration. All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with
robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses). The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524
observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
with returnees from non-Western countries, suggest that the former are more likely
to demand change than the latter (column 3). This result is in line with the findings of
de Haas and Fokkema (2010) (p. 251), who, using semi-structured interviews in the
Todgha valley, note that “exposure to European media and public discourse is likely
to have influenced migrants’ attitudes towards Moroccan lifestyle and bureaucracy.
Also, migrants might attempt to present themselves as more modern and superior by
dissociating themselves from Moroccan authorities and society”.
A further concern might be related to the selectivity/exogeneity of the migration
destination. In fact, it can be argued that more open–minded individuals may prefer
to migrate in the first place to the democratic Western countries. If this is the case,
then the effect previously found would not be due to a migration-induced transfer
of norms, but rather to a selection bias. In Table 19 in the Appendix, we show evi-
dence suggesting that our sample is not remarkably affected by this issue. Indeed,
we exploit three variables included in the IIIMD database in order to proxy for open-
mindedness (“Your main reason to emigrate was to improve your lifestyle”; “Overall,
would you say you are happy to have lived abroad?”; “Would you like to migrate
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again abroad?” ). We then run an additional migration equation where the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the returnee lived in the West, whilst it is 0 if he/she
lived in a non-Western country. Importantly, we control for the three aforementioned
proxies of open-mindedness (both separately in columns 1 to 3, simultaneously in
column 4, and aggregated in a composite indicator through PCA in column 5) and
show that being more open-minded is not a major driver of migration towards more
democratic Western countries. We then use the composite index of open-mindedness
as an additional control in column 4 of Table 6: the results are robust, suggesting
that, if anything, selection into the destination is not a major concern in our sample.
We will come back to the issue of the self-sorting into the destination below, where
we will test the robustness of our main findings to the addition of a further selec-
tion equation. We also check the robustness of our results if the respondent is not
the returnee himself/herself but another member of their households. The results are
robust (see Table 20 in the Appendix).
5.2 Households of current migrants and change
We now turn to the impact of having a current migrant Ei in the household on the
preference for political and social change (Table 7). We estimate the following model:
{
Yi = α0 + α1Ei + α2Xi + α3Fr + εi
Ek = γ0 + γ1At + γ2Zk + γ3Fr + μk (7)
As before, in the political change equation, Yi is the level of political and social
change desired by individual i, which can take any value between 0 (no change) and 1
(complete change). In the emigration equation, Ek is the probability of being an emigrant.
Table 7 Current migration and the preference for political and social change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PCA PCA MCA Equal PCA PCA PCA
Political and social change
Current migration −0.036 −0.140 −0.158 −0.084 −0.134 −0.183 −0.179
(1.67)* (2.66)*** (2.58)*** (1.88)* (2.20)** (2.61)*** (2.49)**
Probability of emigration
Attractiveness 0.073 0.070 0.071 0.058 0.089 0.102
(3.33)*** (3.20)*** (3.10)*** (2.77)*** (3.47)*** (3.52)***
sigma 1 −0.908 −0.908 −0.908 −0.954 −0.881 −0.879
(28.55)*** (28.55)*** (28.53)*** (26.11)*** (22.60)*** (18.64)***
rho 12 0.364 0.381 0.224 0.303 0.517 0.527
(2.37)** (2.74)*** (1.69)* (1.75)* (2.62)*** (2.50)**
N 448 448 448 448 510 300 228
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
The selection equations are based on full sample of 732 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
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Caution is required when estimating this model. Emigration from Morocco is
largely male dominated, and consequently survey respondents in households with
a current emigrant abroad are more likely to be left-behind women compared with
non-migrant families where the male head is usually the respondent. As a matter of
fact, our data show that, whilst no woman has been interviewed among non-migrant
families, one out of three respondents with a current migrant is a female. A clear
bias may arise if men and women carry different social norms. Therefore, in order
to have comparable treatment and control groups, columns 1 to 4 of Table 7 exclude
females from the estimation sample, although we show the robustness of the results
to including women in columns 5 and 6.
Remarkably, left-behind households of current migrants have lower demand for
political and social change across all specifications.16 Column 2 presents our bench-
mark results, controlling for selection into emigration and using the composite index
constructed through PCA. Results are however robust to the use of MCA (column 3)
and equal weights (column 4). It may be the case that current migrants are mostly the for-
mer heads of the household, who migrated abroad in order to provide for the left-behind
family. If this was correct, comparing non-migrant households to respondents with
a current migrant may again bias our estimates, since we might be comparing non-
migrant heads of the family with sons or elderly of migrant heads, who may bear
different social norms. For this reason, column 5 includes only heads of the household
from the analysis. In column 6, we also test the robustness of our findings to focusing
only on employed people, as we may want to restrict the analysis to individuals com-
parable in terms of their labour market status. Finally, column 7 is most parsimonious
specification, where we focus only on male and employed heads of the household.
Regardless of the specification, results suggest a negative impact of current migra-
tion on political and social change, and according to our theoretical predictions, this
should be due to a stream of less democratic norms from destination countries. We
therefore test this hypothesis by disaggregating between Western and non-Western
migrants. Findings in Table 8 do confirm a transfer of norms and show that the negative
coefficient of current migration is driven by migrants from non-Western countries,
which indeed have lower institutional quality and democracy levels than Morocco.
When comparing migrants currently in the West to migrants in non-Western countries,
we notice that, conditional on migration, individuals in Europe and North America are
more likely to transfer political change than migrants in the Arab world (column 3).
5.3 Destination selectivity
Importantly, a still unexplored potential source of bias may be due to the self-
selection process of migrants into destination countries. In fact, when deciding to
emigrate, individuals may choose to move to specific locations according to unob-
servable (to the econometrician) characteristics or preferences. For instance, in the
previous section and Table 19, we provided evidence that open-mindedness does
not affect our results on return migration. In Table 9, we test the robustness of our
16As a robustness, we check for whether monetary remittances affect the left behind’s political attitudes.
All our results are not affected and are not driven by the receipt of monetary remittances.
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Political and social change
Current migration 0.008 −0.095 0.092
(0.16) (2.43)** (2.61)***
Probability of emigration
Attractiveness 0.056 0.057 0.059
(2.59)*** (2.67)*** (2.78)***
sigma 1 −1.013 −1.013 −1.013
(31.45)*** (31.45)*** (31.47)***
rho 12 −0.068 −0.034 0.112
(0.54) (0.60) (0.45)
N 448 448 319
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Column 3 is conditional on
migration. All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust
standard errors (t statistics in parentheses). The selection equations are based on full sample of 732
observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
main findings to the inclusion of an additional selection equation for self-sorting
into Western/non-Western destinations conditional on migration. Specifically, our
dependent variable is a dummy being 1 if migrants’ destination is a Western country
and 0 if it is a non-West (including Arab) country.
In order to estimate the model, however, a further exclusion restriction is needed
which is not correlated with the probability of emigration in the first place nor
the likelihood of return migration or social/political preferences in 2013. We hence
construct the exclusion restriction as the ratio between GDP per capita growth in
France and Libya (the two main destination countries in the two regions) as follows
FLt = GFrance,t /GLibya,t . Again, we use the average age of finishing education
and entering the labour market (i.e. 23 years of age). This would clearly affect the
location where the migrant chooses to move, but not the migration decision itself.
It is worth noting that our previous exclusion restriction for the selection into emi-
gration expressed in Eq. 5 would be violated if we include the selection into the
destination equation in the simultaneous model. In fact, the most attractive foreign
labour market would also affect the destination choice. Hence, we replace this exclu-
sion restriction with the average attractiveness of the foreign market, as follows:
AVt = mean(Gjt − Gmt)W 1990j . We argue that AVt would capture more the push
factor in determining migration: if Morocco is doing badly relative to on average all
other countries, the individual decides to emigrate; otherwise, they would not emi-
grate. Also, FLt (the ratio between GDP per capita growth in France and Libya) when
the individual first enters the labour market—at the age of 23 years—should not have
any impact on the return decision nor on political and social preferences in 2013.
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Table 9 Selection into destination
(1) (2)












Relative growth France/Libya 0.000 0.000
(1.76)* (1.74)*
sigma 1 −1.163 −1.045
(31.27)*** (26.47)***




rho 12 −0.181 0.075
(2.70)*** (0.80)











***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
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We estimate the following system to control for destination selectivity in the case
of return migration, where Dk is a dummy being 1 if the individual migrated to the
West and 0 if he/she migrated to a non-West (including Arab) country.⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Yi = α0 + α1Ri + α2Xi + α3Fr + εi
Rk = β0 + β1Sk + β2Ck + β3Fr + nk
Dk = θ0 + θ1FLt + θ2Ik + θ3Fr+ ∈k
Mk = γ0 + γ1AVt + γ2Zk + γ3Fr + μk
(8)
Similarly in the case of current migrants, we add the destination selection equation
as follows: ⎧⎨
⎩
Yi = α0 + α1Ei + α2Xi + α3Fr + εi
Dk = θ0 + θ1FLt + θ2Ik + θ3Fr+ ∈k
Ek = γ0 + γ1At + γ2Zk + γ3Fr + μk
(9)
Estimates for both return migration (column 1) and the diaspora (column 2) show
that self-selectivity into the destination does not alter our results. We find that return
migration increases the demand for political and social change, but households of cur-
rent migrants are less likely to want change—i.e. our findings remain robust to address-
ing this further potential selection. Indeed, we find that there is positive selection between
choosing Western countries relative to non-Western countries and emigration. How-
ever, we find a negative significant correlation between return migration and Western
destinations relative to non-Western countries, although it is not significant.
We finally calculate the predicted values of the impact of return and current migra-
tion on the preference for political and social change (Table 10). Results suggest
that having a returnee family member increases preference for change by over 60%.
Confirming previous findings, this effect is due to returnees from Western coun-
tries, whilst returnees from non-Western countries have much closer preferences for
change to those of non-migrant households. Focusing on households with a current
migrant shows that on average the diaspora decreases the preference for change by
20 percentage points compared with respondents with no migration experience. This
time, current migrants outside the Western world drive this result.
6 Local effects of returnmigration
In order to show the importance of our findings beyond individual attitudes and pref-
erences, we explore whether social remittances, namely the new political norms that
return migrants bring back home, expand beyond the household of origin to the local
community.17
First, we use the 2011 World Values Survey (WVS) of Morocco and exploit two
questions: “I do not have confidence in the government” and “I am interested into
politics” , which proxy for political preferences. We then utilise the most recent avail-
able population census carried out in 2004 to calculate the share of returnees among
17It is important to note that we use data at the locality level rather than at the individual level for this anal-
ysis as data on election participation as well as individual characteristics (including migration experience)
is scarce.
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Table 10 Average predicted values
With migrant Without migrant Difference (%) P value
Preference for change—return migration
Whole sample 0.649 0.559 0.16 0.000
Returnees from the West 0.641 0.559 0.15 0.000
Returnees from the non-West 0.572 0.559 0.02 0.005
Preference for change—current migration
Whole sample 0.450 0.559 −0.20 0.000
Current migrants in the West 0.557 0.559 0.00 0.000
Current migrants in the non-West 0.464 0.559 −0.17 0.003
P value reports the results of a t test of Ho: migration=non-migrants. Values are weighted by the sampling
weights provided in the dataset. Data source: IIIMD 2013
the population of each of the 24 available sub-regions, which we then merge with the
2011 World Values Survey. The resulting dataset provides information on over 1100
individuals in Morocco on both political norms and the share of returnees in each
sub-region. The following OLS regression is therefore estimated in order to test the
existence of local effects of return migration:
Nis = α0 + α1Rs + α2Cis + εis (10)
where Nis is our proxy of political norms for individual i living in sub-region s,
and Rs is the share of returnees in each of the 24 sub-regions. Controls Cis include
sex and marital status dummies, age and age squared, number of children, educa-
tional attainment and working status as well as a dummy if individual i works for the
government.
Columns 1 (dependent variable: “I do not have confidence in the government”)
and 2 (dependent variable: “I am interested into politics” ) in Table 11 show the
results of Eq. 10, which confirm that return migration affects political norms at the
local level. Since the share of returnees may be endogenous, we also adopt a 2SLS
estimation, where return migration is instrumented by the growth rate of returnees
in each sub-region (RGs). In particular, data on the share of returnees by sub-region
(Rs) are calculated using the 2004 and the 1994 Moroccan census. The growth rate






2SLS estimation in columns 3 and 4 of Table 11 emphasizes the validity of
our instrument and the robustness of our findings: individuals in localities with a
large share of return migrants are more likely than individuals in regions with fewer
returnees to state that they do not have confidence in the government and that they
are not interested in politics.
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Table 11 Local effects of return migration on political norms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: second stage
Share of returnees 7.787 3.776 57.279 26.109
(2.58)** (1.68)* (2.34)** (1.80)*
Panel B: first stage
Return migration change 0.002 0.002
(5.67)*** (5.63)***
R2 0.06 0.18
F Stat 32.11 31.67
N 1073 1155 1073 1155
Dep. var. in columns 1 and 3 is “I do not have confidence in the government”, whilst dep. var. in columns
2 and 4 is “I am interested into politics”. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels,
respectively. All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the datasets, with robust
standard errors (t statistics in parentheses). Data source: World Values Survey (WVS) 2011 ; Census 2004
Second, we want to examine whether political and social attitudes translate into
actions and outcomes. We adopt the Round 5 of the AfroBarometer, a survey that
measures public attitudes on economic, political and social matters in more than 30
African countries, carried out by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR)
in South Africa, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, the Institute for
Empirical Research in Political Economy in Benin, the Institute for Development
Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi and the Department of Political Science at
Michigan State University.
We focus on the survey for Morocco, which was undertaken in 2013 on 1200 indi-
viduals, and we exploit one question on the 2011 parliamentary election: “Did you
vote in the last national election held in 2011?”. It is worth noting that the demonstra-
tions that exploded during the Arab spring led King Mohammed VI to establish an
earlier election, to be held all around Morocco on November 25, 2011. By matching
again the shares of returnees in each of the 60 localities from the 2004 Census with
the AfroBarometer data, we are able to estimate the following specification:
Vil = α0 + α1Rl + α2Cil + εil (12)
where Vil is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i has voted in the 2011 elections; Rl is
the share of returnees in locality l where individual i lives, and Cil are the controls,
which include sex, age, age squared, rural dummy, education and employment status,
as well as proxies for wealth, such as having a shelter’s roof in cement and having
the main source of water inside the house.
Indeed, the results in Table 12 show that individuals living in areas with higher
concentration of returnees are more likely to have participated in the 2011 elections.
Findings are robust to the inclusion of additional controls capturing regional char-
acteristics, such as average educational attainment, employment rate and access to
water and electricity (column 2), as well as instrumenting the share of returnees
in a given locality by the growth rate of returnees in each locality (RGl), as
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Table 12 Local effects of return migration on political outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: second stage
Share of returnees 8.213 21.786 100.490
(1.80)* (3.08)*** (1.72)*
Panel B: first stage
Return migration change 0.001
(4.26)***
Regional controls No Yes Yes
R2 0.11 0.13
F Stat 18.17
N 1200 1200 1200
Dep. var. is a dummy being 1 if the individual has participated in the 2011 national elections. ***, **
and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted by the
sampling weights provided in the datasets, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses). Data
source: AfroBarometer 2013; Census 2004
calculated above. In sum, using different databases, such as the 2011 World Value
Survey, the 2013 AfroBarometer and the 1994/2004 Census, indicates that migration
affects political preferences as well as behaviour.
7 Conclusions
Does international migration act as a driver of political and social change? We look
at the interesting case of Morocco, a North African country that has become a major
emigration hub to Europe and where there have been calls for political change over
the last few years. We exploit a recent and unique dataset in order to test whether
returnee households have different political behaviours and preferences than non-
migrants. The findings provide evidence that return migration has a positive impact
on the preference for political and social change after controlling for the double selec-
tivity of emigration and return migration. We further demonstrate that the positive
impact of return migration is driven by returnees coming from Western countries,
where they have acquired democratic political norms.
We also examine the impact of having a current migrant overseas on the attitudes
of the left behind versus non-migrants. Interestingly, having a current migrant among
the household members has an opposite and negative effect on the demand for politi-
cal and social change, driven by migrants residing in Arab countries, where the level
of political institutions and accountability is low. Importantly, we control for the
destination selectivity and find that our results are not driven by the self-sorting of
migrants across destinations.
Furthermore, in order to show that the impact of migration affects not only
attitudes but also actions, we study electoral participation and find a positive and sig-
nificant impact of the share of returnees in a given locality on the participation rate
in the 2011 parliamentary elections.
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Overall, our findings suggest that international migration can be a driver of polit-
ical and social change. However, the impact of host countries matters, as newly
acquired norms and attitudes are not always “superior” to the norms at origin. This
implies an eventual benefit for migration to Western countries, where the level of
democracy and institutional quality is greater than in the rest of the world, and hence
there is potential for positive social remittances from host to home countries. From
a technical point of view, our paper shows that correcting for selection bias is of
paramount importance when studying social remittances: not only are migrants a
self-selected population, but also those among them who return home are not ran-
domly selected. At the same time, migrants may choose a specific destination based
on unobservable characteristics, and such destination selectivity may have biased the
results of most of previous studies, given that it has often been neglected.
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Appendix
Table 13 Variables included in the composite index and respective weights
Variable Categories Equal PCA MCA
I am not happy on how Agree 0.20 0.2947 0.209
Morocco is administered Disagree −0.083
I do not think we should defend Agree 0.20 0.0966 0.200
the traditional lifestyle in Morocco Disagree −0.009
We need to make more effort Agree 0.20 0.5371 0.083
so that men and women are treated equally Disagree −0.693
We need to make more effort Agree 0.20 0.5571 0.062
so that everybody is treated equally Disagree −0.997
I think people should be more Agree 0.20 0.5523 0.707
involved in the decision-making process Disagree −0.086
Data source: IIIMD, 2013
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Table 14 Robustness check—reference year for attractiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age=25 Age=26 Age=27 Age=28 Age=29 Age=30
Political and social change
Return migration 0.102 0.089 0.109 0.113 0.117 0.113
(3.01)*** (2.56)** (2.72)*** (2.91)*** (3.01)*** (3.09)***
Probability of return migration
Shock 0.792 0.790 0.785 0.784 0.783 0.783
(27.11)*** (26.91)*** (26.09)*** (25.90)*** (25.90)*** (25.89)***
Probability of emigration
Attractiveness 0.049 0.044 0.034 0.035 0.047 0.045
(2.88)*** (2.40)** (1.58) (1.85)* (2.46)** (2.29)**
sigma 1 −1.959 −1.963 −1.956 −1.954 −1.952 −1.954
(41.11)*** (41.50)*** (40.53)*** (40.61)*** (40.39)*** (40.92)***
sigma 2 −1.160 −1.160 −1.160 −1.160 −1.160 −1.160
(30.99)*** (31.00)*** (30.96)*** (30.96)*** (30.95)*** (30.96)***
rho 12 −0.218 −0.209 −0.224 −0.228 −0.231 −0.230
(3.00)*** (2.86)*** (3.00)*** (3.07)*** (3.12)*** (3.10)***
rho 13 −0.206 −0.154 −0.229 −0.242 −0.257 −0.247
(2.19)** (1.58) (1.90)* (2.10)** (2.23)** (2.29)**
rho 23 0.291 0.299 0.319 0.323 0.324 0.322
(6.06)*** (6.34)*** (6.80)*** (6.88)*** (6.92)*** (6.81)***
N 441 441 441 441 441 441
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
Table 15 Robustness check—the direct impact of the historical attractiveness of foreign countries on the
preference for political and social change of non-migrant households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PCA MCA Equal PCA MCA Equal
Attractiveness −0.010 −0.005 −0.013
(0.43) (0.18) (0.56)
Attractiveness (FRA, CAN, LBY) −0.009 −0.004 −0.013
(0.41) (0.16) (0.57)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.16
N 243 243 243 243 243 243
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
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Fig. 1 Emigrants by year and shocks
Table 16 Return migration and the preference for change using a different exclusion restriction for the
selection into emigration (attractiveness in FRA, CAN, LBY)
(1) (2) (3)
PCA MCA Equal
Political and social change
Return migration 0.093 0.072 0.079
(2.72)*** (2.23)** (2.59)***
Probability of return migration
Shock 0.792 0.792 0.792
(27.14)*** (27.16)*** (27.14)***
Probability of emigration
Attractiveness (FRA, CAN, LBY) 0.048 0.049 0.048
(2.81)*** (2.85)*** (2.83)***
sigma 1 −1.160 −1.160 −1.160
(30.99)*** (30.99)*** (31.00)***
sigma 2 −0.981 −0.981 −0.981
(29.63)*** (29.63)*** (29.64)***
rho 12 −0.212 −0.143 −0.171
(2.93)*** (1.99)** (2.38)**
rho 13 −0.170 −0.107 −0.131
(1.78)* (1.37) (1.65)*
rho 23 0.290 0.291 0.290
(6.40)*** (6.40)*** (6.41)***
N 441 441 441
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
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Table 17 Return migration and the preference for change using a different exclusion restriction for the
selection into emigration (Moroccan GDP per capita growth)
(1) (2) (3)
All West Non-West
Political and social change
Return migration 0.092 0.074 −0.044
(2.69)*** (2.69)*** (1.15)
Probability of return migration
Shock 0.794 0.798 0.800
(27.45)*** (28.36)*** (28.40)***
Probability of emigration
Moroccan GDPpc growth −0.009 −0.009 −0.009
(1.90)* (1.93)* (1.97)**
sigma 1 −1.160 −1.161 −1.161
(31.01)*** (31.04)*** (31.05)***
sigma 2 −0.980 −0.980 −0.980
(29.47)*** (29.51)*** (29.52)***
rho 12 −0.210 −0.169 −0.069
(2.91)*** (2.90)*** (1.46)
rho 13 −0.165 −0.113 0.031
(1.72)* (1.38) (0.52)
rho 23 0.280 0.279 0.279
(6.21)*** (6.22)*** (6.25)***
N 441 441 441
The exclusion restriction for emigration is GDP per capita growth rate in Morocco at the age of entry in the
labour market. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications
are weighted by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in
parentheses). The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD
2013
Table 18 Return migration and the preference for change using a different exclusion restriction for the
selection into return migration (conflicts)
(1) (2) (3)
All West Non-West
Political and social change
Return migration 0.142 0.064 −0.053
(1.81)* (1.71)* (1.35)
Probability of return migration
Conflicts 0.669 0.681 0.663
(10.12)*** (9.92)*** (9.84)***





Attractiveness 0.051 0.051 0.051
(2.92)*** (2.92)*** (2.93)***
sigma 1 −1.068 −1.068 −1.068
(33.38)*** (33.38)*** (33.38)***
sigma 2 −0.974 −0.974 −0.974
(29.07)*** (29.08)*** (29.08)***
rho 12 −0.319 −0.124 0.021
(1.83)* (1.38) (0.37)
rho 13 −0.195 −0.111 −0.043
(1.68)* (1.29) (0.56)
rho 23 0.348 0.347 0.348
N 441 441 441
The exclusion restriction for return migration comes from Correlates of War. ***, ** and * represent 1%,
5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted by the sampling weights
provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses). The selection equations are
based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
Table 19 Selection into destination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrated to improve lifestyle −0.043 −0.033
(1.11) (0.84)
Happy to have lived abroad −0.004 0.010
(0.07) (0.18)




R2 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
N 243 234 233 233 233
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
Dep. var. is a dummy being 1 if the returnee lived in the West, whilst it is 0 if he lived in a non-West
country. Data source: IIIMD 2013
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Table 20 Having a returnee family member and the preference for political and social change
(1) (2) (3)
PCA MCA Equal
Political and social change
Household member of a returnee 0.110** 0.091* 0.100**
(0.048) (0.047) (0.043)
Probability of return migration
Shock 0.792*** 0.792*** 0.792***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Probability of emigration
Attractiveness 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
sigma 1 −1.936*** −1.852*** −1.983***
(0.061) (0.094) (0.067)
sigma 2 −1.160*** −1.160*** −1.160***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
rho 12 −0.265** −0.217* −0.232**
(0.123) (0.118) (0.117)
rho 13 −0.204* −0.131 −0.155*
(0.115) (0.089) (0.094)
rho 23 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.291***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
N 291 291 291
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. All specifications are weighted
by the sampling weights provided in the dataset, with robust standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
The selection equations are based on full sample of 1524 observations. Data source: IIIMD 2013
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